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Failing electricity markets: should we shoot the pools?

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  • Green, Richard

Abstract

This Paper discusses the electricity reforms in California and in England and Wales. In both cases, a centralized spot market played a major role, and both markets have now been abolished. This Paper argues that their disappearance is not evidence that future electricity restructuring should avoid the use of spot markets. Instead, the problems in England and Wales were largely due to market power. In California, problems arising from market power and a tightening demand-supply balance were turned into a disaster because the spot market had not been backed up by hedging contracts.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Utilities Policy.

Volume (Year): 11 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 155-167

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Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:11:y:2003:i:3:p:155-167

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30478

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References

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  1. Joanne Evans & Richard Green, 2003. "Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998?," Working Papers 0307, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
  2. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter.
  3. Newbery, D. & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Auctions and trading in energy markets -- an economic analysis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0233, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  4. Green, Richard & Newbery, David M G, 1991. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 107-24, March.
  6. Charles Goldman & Galen Barbose & Joseph Eto, 2002. "California Customer Load Reductions during the Electricity Crisis: Did They Help to Keep the Lights On?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 113-142, June.
  7. John Bower & Derek W. Bunn, 2000. "Model-Based Comparisons of Pool and Bilateral Markets for Electricity," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 1-29.
  8. Newbery, D. M., 1997. "Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9707, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  9. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1999. "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 805-826, September.
  10. Stoft, Steven, 1997. "What should a power marketer want?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 34-45, June.
  11. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 1976. "Peak Load Pricing with a Diverse Technology," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 207-231, Spring.
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Cited by:
  1. Palmer, Karen & Brennan, Timothy & Martinez, Salvador, 2001. "Implementing Electricity Restructuring: Policies, Potholes, and Prospects," Discussion Papers dp-01-62-, Resources For the Future.
  2. Aitor Ciarreta & María Paz Espinosa, 2003. "Market Power In The Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor, 2004. "Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-04, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  4. Singh, Anoop, 2010. "Towards a competitive market for electricity and consumer choice in the Indian power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 4196-4208, August.
  5. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor, 2005. "A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-18, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  6. Thomas, Steve, 2006. "The British Model in Britain: Failing slowly," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 583-600, March.
  7. Timothy Brennan & Karen Palmer & Salvador Martinez, 2002. "Implementing Electricity Restructuring," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 99-132, June.
  8. Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor & Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos, 2004. "Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-02, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  9. René Aïd, 2008. "Long-term risk management for utility companies: the next challenges," Working Papers hal-00409030, HAL.
  10. J. Robert Branston & Roger Sugden & Pedro Valdez & James Wilson, 2006. "Generating Participation and Democracy: An Illustration from Electricity Reform in Mexico," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 47-68.

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