Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000
AbstractThis paper shows that generators exercised increasing market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the second half of the 1990s despite declining market concentration. It examines whether this was consistent with static, non-cooperative oligopoly models, which are widely used to model electricity markets, by testing the static Nash equilibrium assumption that each generator chose its bids to maximise its current profits taking the bids of other generators as given. It finds a significant change in behaviour in late 1996. In 1995 and 1996 generator behaviour was consistent with the static Nash equilibrium assumption if the majority of their output was covered by financial contracts which hedged prices. After 1996 their behaviour was inconsistent with the static Nash equilibrium assumption given their contract cover but it was consistent with tacit collusion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0455.
Date of creation: Oct 2004
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static oligopoly models; market power; Nash equilibrium; tacit collusion; electricity markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2004-10-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2004-10-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2004-10-21 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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