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Does competition affect giving?

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  • Duffy, John
  • Kornienko, Tatiana

Abstract

Charities often devise fund-raising strategies that exploit natural human competitiveness in combination with the desire for public recognition. We explore whether institutions promoting competition can affect altruistic giving - even when possibilities for public acclaim are minimal. In a controlled laboratory experiment based on a sequential "dictator game" , we find that subjects tend to give more when placed in a generosity tournament, and tend to give less when placed in an earnings tournament - even if there is no award whatsoever for winning the tournament. Further we find that subjects' experimental behavior correlates with their responses to a post-experiment questionnaire, particularly questions addressing altruistic and rivalrous behavior. Based on this evidence, we argue that behavior in our experiment is driven, in part, by innate competitive motives.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 74 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (May)
Pages: 82-103

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:74:y:2010:i:1-2:p:82-103

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Keywords: Dictator game Charitable giving Competitive altruism Relative standing Tournaments Factor analysis;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2011. "Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3330-48, December.
  2. Samak, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Visibility of Contributors and Cost of Information: An Experiment on Public Goods," MPRA Paper 46779, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Zhang, Jianlin, 2013. "The impact of social comparison of ability on pro-social behaviour," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 37-46.
  4. Bracha, Anat & Vesterlund, Lise, 2013. "How low can you go? Charity reporting when donations signal income and generosity," Working Papers 13-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  5. Yan Chen & F. Maxwell Harper & Joseph Konstan & Sherry Xin Li, 2010. "Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1358-98, September.
  6. Xiaofei (Sophia) Pan & Daniel Houser, 2011. "Competition for Trophies Triggers Male Generosity," Working Papers 1022, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  7. Samek, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Recognizing Contributors: An Experiment on Public Goods," MPRA Paper 52921, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Tran, Anh & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2012. "Rank as an inherent incentive: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 645-650.
  9. Xiaofei Pan & Daniel Houser, 2011. "Social Approval, Competition, and Cooperation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000299, David K. Levine.

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