Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games: An explorative experimental study
AbstractThis paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are asymmetric, since asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue used by experienced players (as a substitute to communication). It is also shown that although communication is used both to achieve market domination equilibria and cooperative market separating equilibria, the latter type of communication is much more common and successful.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 28 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Communication Market entry Coordination;
Other versions of this item:
- Andersson, Ola & Carlsson, Hans & Holm, Håkan, 2006. "Endogenous Communication and Tacit Coordination in Market Entry Games - An explorative experimental study," Working Papers 2006:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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