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Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium

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  • Burton, Anthony
  • Sefton, Martin

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 23-40

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:23-40

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March.
  2. Olivier Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Working Papers 2005-09, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  4. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
  5. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
  6. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
  7. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March.
  8. Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
  9. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  10. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  11. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CEEL Working Papers 0605, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  2. Andersson, Ola & Carlsson, Hans & Holm, Håkan, 2006. "Endogenous Communication and Tacit Coordination in Market Entry Games - An explorative experimental study," Working Papers 2006:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  3. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2006. "Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634, Stockholm School of Economics.
  4. Keser, Claudia & Suleymanova, Irina & Wey, Christian, 2011. "Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 33, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  5. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities," NBER Working Papers 14115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2007. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 680, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 19 Jun 2008.
  7. Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
  8. Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2013. "Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment," Working Papers 2013/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  9. Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2009. "Divisible-good uniform price auctions: the role of allocation rules and communication among bidders," Discussion Papers 2009-21, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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