Communication, Coordination and Networks
AbstractWe study experimentally how the network structure and length of pre-play communication affect behavior and outcome in a multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network and time effects is more subtle. Under each time treatment, substantial variations are observed in both the rate of coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But increasing the communication length improves both efficiency an equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We also identify behaviors that explain variations in the distribution of coordinated outcomes both within and across networks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 19055.
Date of creation: 20 Nov 2009
Date of revision:
experiment; pre-play communication; coordination; network; efficiency; equity;
Other versions of this item:
- Syngjoo Choi & Jihong Lee, 2014. "Communication, Coordination, And Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 223-247, 02.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2009-12-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-12-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2009-12-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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