Grading exams: 100,99,98,... or A,B,C?
AbstractWe introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed. We apply games of status to grading exams. Our main conclusion is that if students care primarily about their status (relative rank) in class, they are often best motivated to work not by revealing their exact numerical exam scores (100,99,...,1), but instead by clumping them into coarse categories (A,B,C). When student abilities are disparate, the optimal absolute grading scheme is always coarse. Furthermore, it awards fewer A's than there are alpha-quality students, creating small elites. When students are homogeneous, we characterize optimal absolute grading schemes in terms of the stochastic dominance between student performances (when they shirk or work) on subintervals of scores, showing again why coarse grading may be advantageous. In both cases, we prove that absolute grading is better than grading on a curve, provided student scores are independent.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Status Grading Incentives Education Exams;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pradeep Dubey, 2012. "On the Role of Information in Contests," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-11, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014.
"Advances in Auctions,"
54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pradeep K. Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi, 2012. "The Allocation of a Prize," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000402, David K. Levine.
- Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi, 2012. "The Allocation of a Prize (R)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1858, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2014. "Status Incentives with Discrete Effort: A Note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1205-1213.
- James Andreoni & Andy Brownback, 2014. "Grading on a Curve, and other Effects of Group Size on All-Pay Auctions," NBER Working Papers 20184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Darren Grant & William Green, 2013. "Grades as incentives," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1563-1592, June.
- Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sah, 2012. "The Allocation of a Prize (Expanded)," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.