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A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences

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  • Neilson, William S.

Abstract

Recent experimental evidence from dictator games suggests that proposers take money from receivers when taking is an option, and that many proposers are reluctant to play the game. This paper proposes a behavioral model with two components: a choice correspondence that depends on the endowed allocation and the menu of allocations available, and a preference ordering over endowment/menu pairs. The choice correspondence governs behavior when the proposer actually plays a game, and the preference ordering governs the proposer's willingness to play a particular game. The model is then used to characterize notions of proposer kindness, reluctance, and shame.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 394-403

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:394-403

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
  2. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 482-493.
  3. Huber, Joel & Payne, John W & Puto, Christopher, 1982. " Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 90-98, June.
  4. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
  5. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  6. Dana, Jason & Cain, Daylian M. & Dawes, Robyn M., 2006. "What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 193-201, July.
  7. Han Bleichrodt & Ulrich Schmidt, 2002. "A Context-Dependent Model of the Gambling Effect," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(6), pages 802-812, June.
  8. Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, 1993. "Context-Dependent Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(10), pages 1179-1189, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Jawwad Noor & Linxia Ren, 2011. "Temptation and Social Preference," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-040, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  2. Emmanuel PETIT (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113) & Anna TCHERKASSOF (Laboratoire Interuniversitaire de Psychologie. Personnalité, Cognition et Changement Social (LIP/PC2S), Université Pierre Mendès France) , 2012. "Sincere Giving and Shame in a Dictator Game," Cahiers du GREThA 2012-25, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.

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