Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Private Value Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Einy, Ezra
  • Shitovitz, Benyamin
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-458NM6N-29/2/02f78e130d7fc037b9abd2967758a3c7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 2 (February)
    Pages: 287-311

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:287-311

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "Pure Competition, Coalitional Power, and Fair Division," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 337-62, October.
    2. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Values of markets with a continuum of traders," CORE Discussion Papers RP -228, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Aumann, R.J. & Dreze, J.H., 1984. "Values of markets with satiation or fixed prices," CORE Discussion Papers 1984033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Wooders, Myrna Holtz & Zame, William R., 1987. "Large games: Fair and stable outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 59-93, June.
    5. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
    6. Hart, Sergiu, 1977. "Values of non-differentiable markets with a continuum of traders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-116, August.
    7. Krasa, Stefan & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1994. "The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 881-900, July.
    8. Champsaur, Paul, 1975. "Cooperation versus competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 394-417, December.
    9. Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1984. "Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1129-50, September.
    10. Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1997. "An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 314-344, August.
    11. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
    12. Kobayashi, Takao, 1980. "Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1635-65, November.
    13. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 183-97, April.
    14. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1977. "Competitive and value allocations of large exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 419-438, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Angeloni, Laura & Martins-da-Rocha, Victor-Filipe, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/2344, Paris Dauphine University.
    2. Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe & Angeloni, Laura, 2008. "Large economies with differential information but without free disposal," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 671, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    3. Laura Angeloni & V. Martins-da-Rocha, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-286, February.
    4. Angeloni, Laura & Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe, 2007. "Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 647, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:287-311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.