Ezra Einy () (Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, 84105 ISRAEL) Diego Moreno () (Departamento de EconomÃa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903 Getafe, SPAIN) Benyamin Shitovitz () (Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa, 31905 ISRAEL)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information" of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General