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Is bailout insurance and tail risk priced in bank equities?

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  • Del Viva, Luca
  • Kasanen, Eero
  • Saunders, Anthony
  • Trigeorgis, Lenos

Abstract

We present a pricing model of bank bailout insurance guarantees against tail risk and empirical evidence that provides a rational explanation why big bank equities “underperform” relative to small banks during normal times while they “overperform” during crises. A new measure accounting for left-tail risk protection against losses conditional on a crisis explains the “underperformance” of large banks during normal periods. Over the long-term spanning several economic cycles, bank assets are fairly priced regardless of size. Our empirical evidence supports our model’s predicted pattern of excess bank return reversals across economic cycles following Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) bailout policy in 1984.

Suggested Citation

  • Del Viva, Luca & Kasanen, Eero & Saunders, Anthony & Trigeorgis, Lenos, 2021. "Is bailout insurance and tail risk priced in bank equities?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:55:y:2021:i:c:s1572308921000681
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100909
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    TBTF; Government guarantees; Bailouts; Bank equity returns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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