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Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India

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  • Oak, Mandar
  • Swamy, Anand V.

Abstract

The East India Company's conquest of India was facilitated by the behavior of its Indian rivals who not only did not ally against it, but often supported it militarily. Historians have typically attributed this to myopia, the failure to understand the long-term threat represented by the Company. We examine the negotiations leading up to a key conflict, the Third Mysore War, and find that the Company's allies were not myopic. The British parliament had, in 1784, passed Pitt's India Act, which limited the scope for unprovoked military aggression by the Company in India. This had changed the behavior of the Company, making its promises more credible. This enhanced credibility made it possible for the Company to secure as allies Indian regimes that were acting strategically in their self-interest. This is a new explanation for an old puzzle.

Suggested Citation

  • Oak, Mandar & Swamy, Anand V., 2012. "Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 352-366.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:352-366
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2012.03.002
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    3. Laurence S. Moss, 2003. "Editor's Introduction," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 315-318, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaudhary, Latika & Rubin, Jared, 2016. "Religious identity and the provision of public goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 461-483.
    2. Roy, Tirthankar, 2019. "State capacity and the economic history of colonial India," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100723, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    War; Colonialism; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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