The development of the American economy was accompanied by significant spatial income inequalities between the northern and southern regions. While many factors contributed to northern industrialization and southern stagnation, an important factor was differences in their institutions. In the North, a democratic institution fostered growth whereas in the South, an oligarchic institution favored status quo. To gain some insights on the nature and causes of the divergence of these institutions, this paper examines the development of political and legal institutions in Massachusetts and Virginia, the two leading states in the North and the South.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
13431.
Length: Date of creation: Sep 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13431
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
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