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Banking relationship and default priority in consumer credit: Evidence from Thai microdata

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  • Saengchote, Kanis
  • Samphantharak, Krislert

Abstract

Banks play an important role in consumer credit, and when borrowers face a decision on whether to default on mortgage or non-mortgage loans first, banking relationship may matter. Our study provides first evidence into the interplay between banking relationship and consumer default priority via credit bureau data of 1 million individuals in Thailand. We find that same-bank borrowers are less likely to default on mortgage loans first, and borrowers with longer banking relationship and lower switching cost are more likely to default on mortgage loans first (which is welfare-improving). Our results suggest that banking relationship can lead to better outcomes for defaulting borrowers even when switching cost is high.

Suggested Citation

  • Saengchote, Kanis & Samphantharak, Krislert, 2022. "Banking relationship and default priority in consumer credit: Evidence from Thai microdata," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:52:y:2022:i:c:s1566014122000218
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2022.100904
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    1. Nicoleta Andreea Neacșu & Carmen Elena Anton & Camelia Mirela Baba & Anca Popescu, 2023. "Financial and Banking Education of Consumers in the Context of Sustainable Development Society," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-22, June.
    2. Kanis Saengchote, 2023. "Developers' Leverage, Capital Market Financing, and Fire Sale Externalities Evidence from the Thai Condominium Market," Papers 2312.05013, arXiv.org.
    3. Kanis Saengchote, 2023. "Developers’ Leverage, Capital Market Financing, and Fire Sale Externalities: Evidence from the Thai Condominium Market," PIER Discussion Papers 212, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage loan; Unsecured debt; Pecking order; Banking relationship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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