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Game theory and the spectrum auctions

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Author Info
Milgrom, Paul

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VKKB1K-10/2/c3506e78516c7668b8eadab5d5f922a3
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Pages: 771-778
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:771-778

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  1. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test," Working Papers 200102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Damme, E. van, 1999. "The Dutch DCS-1800 auction," Discussion Paper 77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Anders Lunander & Jan-Eric Nilsson, 2003. "Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts," Working Papers 2003.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  4. LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002. "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," Les Cahiers de Recherche 765, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tomomi Tanaka, 2007. "Resource Allocation with Spatial Externalities: Experiments on Land Consolidation," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1622-1622. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999. "Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 1063, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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