On the uniqueness of optimal prices set by monopolistic sellers
AbstractThis paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid for a very wide range of distributions of valuations. The results carry over to the optimal minimum price in independent private value auctions. In addition, they can be fruitfully applied in the analysis of quantity discount price policies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Econometrics.
Volume (Year): 141 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeconom
Other versions of this item:
- van den Berg, Gerard J, 2005. "On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5166, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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