Money and rank in the labor market
AbstractWe analyze the gains/losses in wage and in rank position for workers switching firm. Voluntary movers enjoy a wage premium relative to stayers, but that premium declines with rank inside the new firm, indicating that movers are trading-off money and rank.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 115 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Wage structure; Job movers; Linked employer–employee data;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
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