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Status and incentives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Emmanuelle Auriol
Régis Renault
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This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher-status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.
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Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal The RAND Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 39 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 305-326
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Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:305-326Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2007.
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