Games of Status and Discrininatory Contract
AbstractFollowing recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers’ wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent utility functions into a moral hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers, but no correlation in production. Workers’ concern for the rank of their wage in the firm’s wage distribution may induce the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts when its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 759.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2006-09-16 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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