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Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax

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  • Kunce, Mitch
  • Shogren, Jason F.

Abstract

One consequence of decentralized responsibility to set tax policy and environmental standards is that local governments might try to attract industry and jobs by underproviding local public goods with lower taxes or lax environmental standards or both. But if local authorities exploit fixed property site (i.e., land) taxation to fund local public goods, affect firm migration, and internalize potential local emission rents, herein we find decentralized efficiency is supported. This result reflects a dual form of the classic Henry George theorem previously overlooked.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.

Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 569-573

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:569-573

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

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References

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  1. Kangoh Lee, 2003. "Should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 350-372, May.
  2. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Competitive jurisdictions, congestion, and the Henry George Theorem : When should property be taxed instead of land?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 351-370, November.
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    • Fullerton, Don & Metcalf, Gilbert E., 2002. "Tax incidence," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 26, pages 1787-1872 Elsevier.
  4. Kunce, Mitch & Shogren, Jason F., 2002. "On Environmental Federalism and Direct Emission Control," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 238-245, March.
  5. Wellisch Dietmar, 1995. "Locational Choices of Firms and Decentralized Environmental Policy with Various Instruments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 290-310, May.
  6. Man, Joyce Y., 1995. "The Incidence of Differential Commercial Property Taxes: Empirical Evidence," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(4), pages 479-96, December.
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  8. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  9. Richter, Wolfram F. & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1996. "The provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of firm and household mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 73-93, April.
  10. Feldstein, Martin S, 1977. "The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New Answer to an Old Question," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 349-60, April.
  11. Braid, Ralph M, 1996. "Symmetric Tax Competition with Multiple Jurisdictions in Each Metropolitan Area," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1279-90, December.
  12. Matsumoto, Mutsumi, 1998. "A note on tax competition and public input provision," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 465-473, July.
  13. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
  14. Kunce, Mitch, 2000. "A Nash tax game extending the generality of the Henry George Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 229-233, February.
  15. Wellisch,Dietmar, 2000. "Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521630351, October.
  16. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
  17. Kunce, Mitch & Shogren, Jason F., 2005. "On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 212-224, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Miklós Antal & Jeroen van den Bergh, 2014. "Macroeconomics, Financial Crisis and the Environment: Strategies for a Sustainability Transition," WWWforEurope Policy Paper series 10, WWWforEurope.

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