Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Free-riding, carbon treaties, and trade wars: the role of domestic environmental policies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Abrego, Lisandro
  • Perroni, Carlo

Abstract

This paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model of North-South trade with carbon emissions to explore the strategic, open-economy implications of price and quantity based instruments for CO2 emission reduction. We compute non-cooperative environmental and trade policy equilibria and Nash bargaining outcomes in environmental policies with side payments of cash. Results show that quotas can lead to higher internalization levels in a non- cooperative zero-tariff equilibrium in comparison with emission fees. If tariffs are also chosen non-cooperatively, the form of policy instrument used affects equilibrium tariffs, with quotas leading to lower trade barriers, particularly under a regional carbon treaty.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBV-3VTR7CV-9/2/e878916fdf5cd84639f650c01d6e265b
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 58 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 463-483

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:58:y:1999:i:2:p:463-483

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  2. Fishelson, Gideon, 1976. "Emission control policies under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-197, October.
  3. Adar, Zvi & Griffin, James M., 1976. "Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 178-188, October.
  4. Ludema, R.D. & Wooton, I., 1992. "Cross-Border Externalities and trade Liberalization: The Strategic Control of Pollution," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9202, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  5. Carlo Perroni & Randall M. Wigle, 1994. "International Trade and Environmental Quality: How Important Are the Linkages?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 551-67, August.
  6. Rodriguez, Carlos Alfredo, 1974. "The non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas under retaliation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 295-298, August.
  7. Desvousges, William H. & Smith, V. Kerry & Fisher, Ann, 1987. "Option price estimates for water quality improvements: A contingent valuation study for the monongahela river," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 248-267, September.
  8. Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1995. "Trade and Transboundary Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 716-37, September.
  9. M. L. Weitzman, 1973. "Prices vs. Quantities," Working papers 106, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Wallace Oates & William Baumol, 1975. "The Instruments for Environmental Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Analysis of Environmental Problems, pages 95-154 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Markusen, James R., 1975. "International externalities and optimal tax structures," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29, February.
  12. Perroni, Carlo & Rutherford, Thomas F, 1993. " International Trade in Carbon Emission Rights and Basic Materials: General Equilibrium Calculations for 2020," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 257-78.
  13. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June.
  14. Mestelman, Stuart, 1989. "Taxes, Subsidies, Standards, and Social Choices," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 44(2), pages 268-84.
  15. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
  16. Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-22, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:58:y:1999:i:2:p:463-483. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.