Taxes, Subsidies, Standards, and Social Choices
AbstractA general equilibrium model of an economy characterized by a production externality is presented. Preferences of individuals in the economy for the use of taxes, subsidies, and output quotas as competing instruments for internalizing the externality are compared in the presence of alternative endowments of resources across agents in the economy and a distribution mechanism permitting different tax or transfer progressivity. The tax, subsidy, and standard are demonstrated, at different times, to emerge as the socially preferred instrument under majority-rule voting. The implementation of inefficient policy instruments is not necessarily the result of effective minority interest-group pressure.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance = Finances publiques.
Volume (Year): 44 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 1998.
"Free-Riding, Carbon Treaties and Trade Wars: the Role of Domestic Environmental Policies,"
CSGR Working papers series
09/98, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
- Abrego, Lisandro & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Free-riding, carbon treaties, and trade wars: the role of domestic environmental policies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 463-483, April.
- Fredriksson, Per G., 1998. "Environmental policy choice: Pollution abatement subsidies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-63, March.
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