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Does corporate control determine the cross-listing location?

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  • Abdallah, Wissam
  • Goergen, Marc

Abstract

This paper explains the choice of the cross-listing location with particular emphasis on the level of investor protection provided by the host market. We find that firms with concentrated control, with a higher level of risk and those with more pronounced financing needs cross-list on a market with better investor protection. We also find support for the bonding hypothesis as firms from markets with weak shareholder protection tend to cross-list on markets with significantly higher shareholder protection.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Corporate Finance.

Volume (Year): 14 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 183-199

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Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:14:y:2008:i:3:p:183-199

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mishra, Anil V. & Ratti, Ronald A., 2011. "Governance, monitoring and foreign investment in Chinese companies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 171-188, June.
  2. Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2008. "Contractual Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2008-41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Wang, Daphne & Esqueda, Omar A., 2014. "National cultural effects on leverage decisions: Evidence from emerging-market ADRs," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 152-177.
  4. Daugherty, Mary & Georgieva, Dobrina, 2011. "Foreign cultures, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and cross-delisting," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 208-223, October.
  5. Georgieva, Dobrina & Jandik, Tomas, 2012. "Alternative paths of convergence toward U.S. market and legal regulations: Cross-listing vs. merging with U.S. bidders," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 230-251.

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