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Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control

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Author Info
Lucian Arye Bebchuk

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Abstract

This paper develops a framework for analyzing transactions that transfer a company's controlling block from an existing controller to a new controller. This framework is used to compare the market rule, which is followed in the United States, with the equal opportunity rule, which prevails in some other countries. The market rule is superior to the equal opportunity rule in facilitating efficient transfers of control but inferior to it in discouraging inefficient transfers. Conditions under which one of the two rules is overall superior are identified; for example, the market rule is superior if existing and new controllers draw their characteristics from the same distributions. Finally, the rules' effects on surplus division are analyzed and this examination reveals a rationale for mandatory rules.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4788.

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Date of creation: Oct 1995
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4788

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Megginson, William L, 1990. "Restricted Voting Stock, Acquisition Premiums, and the Market Value of Corporate Control," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 175-98, May.
  2. Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1992. "The Law and Large-Block Trades," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 265-94, October.
  3. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1989. "Takeover Bids below the Expected Value of Minority Shares," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(02), pages 171-184, June. [Downloadable!]
  7. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1988. "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations : An exploratory analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 317-346, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Roe, Mark J., 1990. "Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 7-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kahan, Marcel, 1993. "Sales of Corporate Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 368-79, October.
  15. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1994. "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 957-93, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1988. "Takeover Bids below the Expected Value of Minority Shares," NBER Working Papers 2524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, 1999. "The 'Lemons Effect' in Corporate Freeze-Outs," NBER Working Papers 6938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 2005. "Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jens Köke, 2002. "Dynamics in ownership and firm survival: Evidence from corporate Germany," MEA discussion paper series 02013, Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lucian Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, 1999. "Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights," NBER Working Papers 6951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Heiss, Florian & Köke, Jens, 2001. "Dynamics in ownership and firm survival : evidence from corporate Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-63, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, 1996. "Corporate Ownership Structures: Private versus Social Optimality," NBER Working Papers 5584, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Poulsen, Thomas, 2008. "Private benefits in corporate control transactions," Finance Research Group Working Papers F-2008-03, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bergman, Nittai & Nicolaievsky, Daniel, 2004. "Investor Protection and the Coasian View," Working papers 4476-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  9. Haselmann, Rainer & Pistor, Katharina & Vig, Vikrant, 2006. "How Law Affects Lending," MPRA Paper 157, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jens Köke, 2002. "Dynamics in ownership and firm survival: Evidence from corporate Germany," MEA discussion paper series 02013, Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1995. "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 4788, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonhard, 2000. "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 2001. "Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 8633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Hart, Oliver, 2001. "Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3073, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Nenova, Tatiana, 2006. "Takeover laws and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4029, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Albuquerque, Rui & Schroth, Enrique, 2008. "Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Köke, Jens, 2001. "Determinants of acquisition and failure : stylized facts and lessons for empirical studies," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-30, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  19. Damiani, Mirella & Pompei, Fabrizio, 2008. "Mergers, acquisitions and technological regimes: the European experience over the period 2002- 2005," MPRA Paper 8226, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Armando Gomes, . "Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs, and Dynamic Trading," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 4-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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