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Failed Bank Resolution and the Collateral Crunch: The Advantages of Adopting Transferable Puts

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Eric S. Rosengren
Katerina Simons

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Abstract

Current methods of failed bank resolution are unnecessarily expensive for taxpayers and impose substantial costs on borrowers at failed banks. This situation is the result of distorted incentives imbedded in the standard contract between the government and acquirers of failed banks, which result in more loan foreclosures than if the loan were held by a well-capitalized bank. This paper proposes a modification to the standard contract in the form of a transferable put, which would introduce market-based incentives to the disposition of failed bank assets. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1540-6229.00629
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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association in its journal Real Estate Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 135-147
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Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:22:y:1994:i:1:p:135-147

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1080-8620

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Flannery, Mark J., 1989. "Capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 235-258, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sally M. Davies & Douglas A. McManus, 1991. "The effects of closure policies on bank risk-taking," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 158, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Frederick T. Furlong & Michael C. Keeley, 1987. "Bank capital regulation and asset risk," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Spr, pages 20-40. [Downloadable!]
  4. Davies, Sally M. & McManus, Douglas A., 1991. "The effects of closure policies on bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 917-938, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Kanatas, George, 1985. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 84-95, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Furlong, Frederick T. & Keeley, Michael C., 1989. "Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: A note," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 883-891, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1996. "Can studies of application denials and mortgage defaults uncover taste-based discrimination?," Working Papers 96-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mark M. Spiegel, 2001. "The disposition of failed bank assets: put guarantees or loss-sharing arrangements?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2001-12, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paul Hoffman & Anthony M. Santomero, 1998. "Problem Bank Resolution: Evaluating the Options," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter Nigro & Kevin Jacques, 2000. "Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 149-164, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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