The Political Economy Of Fiscal Prudence In Historical Perspective
AbstractThis paper uses a new panel dataset to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and financial rectitude over the long run. Old Regime polities in Europe typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that political transformations toward centralized and limited regimes led to significant improvements in fiscal prudence. Dynamic estimations and structural breaks tests reinforce these findings. The results suggest that good financial housekeeping is one mechanism through which political reforms reduce sovereign credit risk. Copyright 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 22 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
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- J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Peter H. Lindert, 2008. "Kenneth Sokoloff on Inequality in the Americas," NBER Chapters, in: Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: Geography, Institutions, and the Knowledge Economy, pages 363-372 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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