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On Equilibrium Player Ordering In Dynamic Team Contests

Author

Listed:
  • Qiang Fu
  • Jingfeng Lu

Abstract

We study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all‐pay contest between two teams. The contest lasts two periods, and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams. The team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize, which is a public good to its players. Each team has one stronger player and one weaker player, and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize. The teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods. We find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive, the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the “anchormen.” When both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams' values become excessively large, the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position, who will place a large bid to preempt late competition. (JEL C7, D7, D8)

Suggested Citation

  • Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu, 2020. "On Equilibrium Player Ordering In Dynamic Team Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1830-1844, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:4:p:1830-1844
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12907
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, David, 2020. "Task arrangement in team competitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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