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Monetary Commitment and Fiscal Discretion: The Optimal Policy Mix

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  • Stefano Gnocchi

Abstract

We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the stabilization goals of the central bank. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E52, E58, E62)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 187-216

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:5:y:2013:i:2:p:187-216

Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.5.2.187
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