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Nominal Debt as a Burden to Monetary Policy

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Author Info
Giorgia Giovannetti (Universita di Firenze and European University Institute)
Ramon Marimon (European University Institute)
Pedro Teles (Banco de Portugal and Universidade Catolica Portuguesa)

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Abstract

We study a dynamic equilibrium model where the same optimal monetary policy is implemented with and without full commitment if government debt is indexed. In contrast, with nominal debt, the full commitment policy is time inconsistent, since the government is tempted to inflate away its nominal liabilities. We characterize the optimal sequential policy. It has the feature that government debt is progressively depleted, and so, eventually, the time inconsistency problem vanishes. We compare this equilibrium to a myopic solution and to the Ramsey solution.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1387.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1387

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ramon Marimon & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Pedro Teles, 2003. "Inside-outside money competition," Working Paper Series WP-03-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1985. "Money and Asset Prices in a Cash-in-Advance Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 919-44, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sims, Christopher A, 1994. "A Simple Model for Study of the Determination of the Price Level and the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 381-99.
  4. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. repec:cup:macdyn:v:1:y:1997:i:3:p:588-614 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Javier Díaz-Giménez & Giorgia Giovannetti & Ramon Marimon & Pedro Teles, 2004. "Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy," Working Paper Series WP-04-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Fernando M. Martin, 2004. "A Positive Theory of Government Debt," Macroeconomics 0408013, EconWPA, revised 12 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Fernando Alvarez & Patrick J. Kehoe & Pablo Andrés Neumeyer, 2004. "The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 541-567, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Reis, Catarina, 2006. "Taxation without Commitment," MPRA Paper 2071, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Michael Woodford, 1996. "Control of the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price Stability?," NBER Working Papers 5684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ellison, Martin & Rankin, Neil, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are unavailable: A reconsideration of the outcomes under commitment and discretion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 219-243, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Robert E. Lucas Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital," Discussion Papers 532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(03), pages 588-614, September. [Downloadable!]
  15. Mats Persson & Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 193-212, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Juan P. Nicolini, 1993. "More on the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Monetary Policy," Economics Working Papers 56, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2008. "Political disagreement, lack of commitment and the level of debt," International Finance Discussion Papers 938, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  2. Javier Diaz-Gimenez & Giorgia Giovannetti & Ramon Marimon & Pedro Teles, 2008. "Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 493-514, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Michael Kumhof & Evan Tanner, 2005. "Government Debt: A Key Role in Financial Intermediation," IMF Working Papers 05/57, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Klaus Adam & Roberto M. Billi, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy," Research Working Paper RWP 07-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Fabio Canova & Evi Pappa, 2004. "Does it Cost to be Virtuous? The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints," Economics Working Papers 926, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Philippe Michel & Leopold von Thadden & Jean-Piere Vidal, 2005. "Debt stabilizing fiscal rules," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 349, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Stefan Niemann, 2009. "Dynamic Monetary-Fiscal Interactions and the Role of Monetary Conservatism," Economics Discussion Papers 667, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Fernando M. Martin, 2004. "A Positive Theory of Government Debt," Macroeconomics 0408013, EconWPA, revised 12 Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Paul Klein & Per Krusell & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2004. "Time-Consistent Public Expenditures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000652, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2007. "Nominal versus Indexed Debt: A Quantitative Horse Race," NBER Working Papers 13131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Canova, Fabio & Pappa, Evi, 2005. "The Elusive Costs and the Immaterial Gains of Fiscal Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 5406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Roberto Billi & Klaus Adam, 2005. "Monetary and Fiscal Interactions without Commitment and the Value of Monetary Conservatism," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 62, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
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