Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gibbons, Robert

Abstract

This paper analyzes strategic communication in equilibrium models of conventional and final-offer interest arbitration. Both models emphasize the role of learning by the arbitrator from the parties offers about the state of the employment relationship, which is known to the parties but not to the arbitrator. In both models, the arbitrators equilibrium behavior is identical to the reduced-form decision rule typically assumed in the empirical literature. The paper thereby provides a structural interpretation for the existing empirical work. The paper also represents progress towards a complete theory of arbitration because it satisfies three conditions that will be required of any such theory. First, the models predictions match the existing empirical evidence. Second, the models describe equilibrium behavior. And third, the models are built on a common set of assumptions about preferences, information, and commitment. The paper therefore not only provides an equilibrium foundation for the intuition that the arbitrator might learn from the parties offers, but also uses the idea of learning to develop a unified analytical treatment of the two major forms of interest arbitration.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198812%2978%3A5%3C896%3ALIEMOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R&origin=repec
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 78 (1988)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 896-912

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:5:p:896-912

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  2. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 69-82, January.
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  6. David E. Bloom, 1986. "Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jeremy Bertomeu & Hamid Beladi, 2007. "Mediator learning and dowry determination in an arranged marriage setting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(12), pages 1-10.
  2. Clara Ponsati & Adamuz & Mercedes, 2004. "Arbitration Systems and Negotiations," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 118, Econometric Society.
  3. Kaplan, David S. & Sadka, Joyce & Silva-Mendez, Jorge Luis, 2007. "Litigation and settlement : new evidence from labor courts in Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4434, The World Bank.
  4. repec:fth:prinin:285 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2003. "International agreements on product standard: an incomplete contracting theory," NBER Working Papers 9533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Martinelli, Cesar & Matsui, Akihiko, 2002. " Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 39-61.
  7. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," NBER Working Papers 12202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Janet Currie, 1989. "Wages and Arbitrator Behavior," UCLA Economics Working Papers 562, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. R. Marselli & M. Vannini & BC. McCannon, 2013. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Arbitration," Working Paper CRENoS 201309, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  10. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2004. "A Model of Arbitration in Regulation," Documentos de Trabajo 267, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  11. Cesar Martinelli & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Working Papers 9905, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Jan 2000.
  12. Wojciech Olszewski, 2011. "A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 174-213, February.
  13. repec:fth:prinin:296 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Andersson, Thomas, 1990. "Government Failure: The Case of Global Environmental Mismanagement," Working Paper Series 287, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  15. repec:fth:prinin:267 is not listed on IDEAS

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:5:p:896-912. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.