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The early history of the box diagram

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  • Thomas M. Humphrey

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  • Thomas M. Humphrey, 1996. "The early history of the box diagram," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 37-75.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:1996:i:win:p:37-75
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    File URL: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/RichmondFedOrg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/1996/winter/pdf/history.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Scitovsky, Tibor, 1984. "Lerner's Contribution to Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 1547-1571, December.
    3. John Creedy, 1992. "Demand And Exchange In Economic Analysis," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 110.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Duffie, Darrell & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1989. "Arrow and General Equilibrium Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 565-598, June.
    6. R. W. Jones, 1956. "Factor Proportions and the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 24(1), pages 1-10.
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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad P Körding & Izumi Fukunaga & Ian S Howard & James N Ingram & Daniel M Wolpert, 2004. "A Neuroeconomics Approach to Inferring Utility Functions in Sensorimotor Control," PLOS Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 2(10), pages 1-1, September.
    2. Mary Morgan, 2001. "Models, stories and the economic world," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(3), pages 361-384.

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    Economic history;

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