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Break Fee Restrictions: Where's the Harm?

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  • Jessica Curtis
  • Sean Pinder

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  • Jessica Curtis & Sean Pinder, 2007. "Break Fee Restrictions: Where's the Harm?," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 14(2), pages 111-122.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:agenda:v:14:y:2007:i:2:p:111-122
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    File URL: http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p86911/pdf/14-2-A-3.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. S. Rosenkranz & U. Weitzel, 2005. "Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions," Working Papers 05-32, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Klemperer, Paul, 1998. "Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 757-769, May.
    3. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, 2007. "Do Termination Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(2), pages 461-489.
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