Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision

Citations

Cited by:

1. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
2. Romuald Elie & Dylan Possamai, 2016. "Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents," Papers 1605.08099, arXiv.org.
3. Dietl, Helmut M. & Grossmann, Martin & Lang, Markus & Wey, Simon, 2013. "Incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal-agent model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 93-104.
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   • Helmut M. Dietl & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang & Simon Wey, 2012. "Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers 313, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
4. Jaeyoung Sung, 2005. "Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Approach," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 1021-1073.
5. René Carmona & Peiqi Wang, 2021. "Finite-State Contract Theory with a Principal and a Field of Agents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(8), pages 4725-4741, August.
6. Thibaut Mastrolia & Dylan Possamai, 2015. "Moral hazard under ambiguity," Papers 1511.03616, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2016.
7. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October.
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   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model," Munich Reprints in Economics 20657, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers in Economics 335, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   • Schmidt, Klaus & Fehr, Ernst, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 4464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
8. Kerem Ugurlu, 2018. "Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk averse agent and principal," Papers 1806.01495, arXiv.org.
9. Mehmet Barlo & Ayça Özdoğan, 2013. "The Optimality of Team Contracts," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-20, November.
10. Jaeyoung Sung, 2022. "Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 593-642, September.
11. Villeneuve, Stéphane & Abi Jaber, Eduardo, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," TSE Working Papers 22-1363, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
12. Martin F. Hellwig & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2002. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2225-2264, November.
    • Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion, Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Hellwig, Martin F. & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2002. "Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision," Munich Reprints in Economics 19425, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Hellwig, Martin F. & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Discussion Papers in Economics 22, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-52, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Hellwig, Martin & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision," Papers 98-06, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
13. James Mirrlees & Roberto Raimondo, 2013. "Strategies in the principal-agent model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 605-656, August.
14. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine.
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
15. Guo, Ming & Ou-Yang, Hui, 2006. "Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 150-191, July.
16. Eduardo Abi Jaber & St'ephane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Papers 2209.10878, arXiv.org.
17. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 17, pages 369-388, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
    • Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 3196334, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
18. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
19. Dena Firoozi & Arvind V Shrivats & Sebastian Jaimungal, 2021. "Principal agent mean field games in REC markets," Papers 2112.11963, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
20. Barlo, Mehmet & Özdog˜an, Ayça, 2014. "Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 46-52.
    • Mehmet Barlo & Ayca Ozdogan, 2011. "Optimality of Linearity with Collusion and Renegotiation," Working Papers 1109, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    • Barlo, Mehmet & Ozdogan, Ayca, 2011. "Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation," MPRA Paper 35548, University Library of Munich, Germany.
21. Thibaut Mastrolia & Zhenjie Ren, 2017. "Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency without Communication," Papers 1706.02936, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2018.
22. Barlo, Mehmet & Ayca, Ozdogan, 2012. "Team beats collusion," MPRA Paper 37449, University Library of Munich, Germany.
23. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Lemmon, Michael L. & Felix Meschke, J., 2012. "Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 149-168.
    • Coles, Jeffrey & Lemmon, Michael & Meschke, Felix, 2007. "Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance: the Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance," MPRA Paper 4374, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Feb 2007.
24. Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Post-Print hal-03783062, HAL.
25. Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Working Papers hal-03783062, HAL.
26. Hellwig, Martin F., 2007. "The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmstrom-Milgrom type," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 446-475, September.
27. Han, Jinhui & Ma, Guiyuan & Yam, Sheung Chi Phillip, 2022. "Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 768-780.
28. Camilo Hern'andez & Dylan Possamai, 2023. "Time-inconsistent contract theory," Papers 2303.01601, arXiv.org.
29. Jakša Cvitanić & Dylan Possamaï & Nizar Touzi, 2018. "Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-37, January.
30. Emma Hubert, 2020. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Papers 2007.10758, arXiv.org.
31. Jessica Martin & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2023. "Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 46(1), pages 1-43, June.
32. Jakv{s}a Cvitani'c & Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2015. "Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems," Papers 1510.07111, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2017.
33. Jessica Martin & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2023. "Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks," Post-Print hal-04164688, HAL.
34. Chang Liu, 2022. "Robust Contracts with Exploration," Papers 2212.00157, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
35. Thibaut Mastrolia & Zhenjie Ren, 2018. "Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency without Communication," Working Papers hal-01534611, HAL.
36. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.