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Citations for "An experimental study of a dynamic principal-agent relationship"

by Werner Güth & Wolfgang Klose & Manfred Königstein & Joachim Schwalbach

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon G�chter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
  2. Lory Barile, 2012. "Does tax evasion affect firms’ internal control? Some evidence from an experimental approach," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 039, University of Siena.
  3. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2011. "Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-176, February.
  4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October.
  5. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2008. "“Optimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experimentâ€," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt29v1b0pg, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  6. Güth, Werner & Königstein, Manfred & Marchand, Nadège & Nehring, Klaus, 2000. "Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,110, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  7. Königstein, Manfred & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2007. "Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 2697, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2013. "Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 71-86.
  9. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. & Popova, Vera, 2012. "Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents," Munich Reprints in Economics 18169, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  10. Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2004. "Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 1215, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00175051, HAL.
  12. Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, . "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 018, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  13. Falk, Armin & Gächter, Simon, 2001. "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers 034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  15. Charness, Gary B & Cabrales, Antonio & VILLEVAL, MARIE-CLAIRE, 2007. "Competition, Hidden Information, And Efficiency: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3kp5v19m, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  16. Keser, Claudia & Willinger, Marc, 2007. "Theories of behavior in principal-agent relationships with hidden action," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 1514-1533, August.
  17. Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007. "Fairness and Contract Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, 01.
  18. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
  19. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00151509 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2005. "How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage," IZA Discussion Papers 1777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  21. Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0127h86v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  22. Wright, Peter & Mukherji, Ananda & Kroll, Mark J., 2001. "A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 413-429.
  23. Ranjay Gulati & Maxim Sytch, 2008. "Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 165-190.
  24. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2008. "How many winners are good to have?: On tournaments with sabotage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 682-702, March.
  25. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  26. van Wijk, R.A.J.L. & van den Bosch, F.A.J. & Volberda, H.W. & Heinhuis, S.M., 2005. "Reciprocity of Knowledge Flows in Internal Network Forms of Organizing," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-024-STR, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  27. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2006. "Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00142849, HAL.
  28. Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, 2001. "Reputation or Reciprocity? An Experimental Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 496, CESifo Group Munich.
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