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Citations for "An experimental study of a dynamic principal-agent relationship"

by Werner Güth & Wolfgang Klose & Manfred Königstein & Joachim Schwalbach

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
  2. Königstein, Manfred & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2007. "Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 2697, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007. "Fairness and Contract Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, 01.
  4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October.
  5. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2011. "Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-176, February.
  6. Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002. "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June.
  7. Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2004. "Contracts, Fairness and Incentives," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000148, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Falk, Armin & Gächter, Simon, 2001. "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Keser, Claudia & Willinger, Marc, 2007. "Theories of behavior in principal-agent relationships with hidden action," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 1514-1533, August.
  10. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers 034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  11. Villeval, Marie Claire & Charness, Gary & Cabrales, Antonio, 2006. "Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we071909, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  12. Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, 2001. "Reputation or Reciprocity? An Experimental Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 496, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
  14. Wright, Peter & Mukherji, Ananda & Kroll, Mark J., 2001. "A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 413-429.
  15. Angelova, Vera & Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2012. "Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 48-58.
  16. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2008. "“Optimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experimentâ€," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt29v1b0pg, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  17. Ranjay Gulati & Maxim Sytch, 2008. "Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 165-190.
  18. Werner G³th & Manfred K÷nigstein & NadÞge Marchand & Klaus Nehring, 2001. "Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Game with Indirect Reward," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 241-262.
  19. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  20. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2005. "How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage," IZA Discussion Papers 1777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  21. Sebastian Galiani & Cheryl Long & Camila Navajas & Gustavo Torrens, 2016. "Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence," NBER Working Papers 21857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2013. "Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 71-86.
  23. van Wijk, R.A.J.L. & van den Bosch, F.A.J. & Volberda, H.W. & Heinhuis, S.M., 2005. "Reciprocity of Knowledge Flows in Internal Network Forms of Organizing," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-024-STR, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  24. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  25. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2008. "How many winners are good to have?: On tournaments with sabotage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 682-702, March.
  26. Lory Barile, 2012. "Does tax evasion affect firms’ internal control? Some evidence from an experimental approach," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 039, University of Siena.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.