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Citations for "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System"

by Shavell, Steven

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  1. McAfee, R. Preston & Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H., 2008. "Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1863-1875, October.
  2. Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
  4. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue," Working papers 2008-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  5. Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-071/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. Aldo González & Alejandro Micco, 2013. "Private vs Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile," Working Papers wp378, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March.
  8. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May.
  9. Ingo Vogelsang & Nishal Ramphal & Stephen Carroll & Nicholas Pace, 2007. "An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, August.
  10. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
  11. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.
  12. Aldo, González & Alejandro, Micco & Constanza, Caicha, 2013. "El impacto de la persecución pública en los juicios de libre competencia en Chile," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(132), pages 39-69.
  13. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Law," Discussion Papers 05-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  14. Tim Reuter, 2012. "Private antitrust enforcement revisited: The role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-04, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  15. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Discussion Papers 05-004, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  16. Duke, Joshua M. & Jost, Ryan P., 2000. "The Mediation Of Variance Conflicts: An Empirical Evaluation," Staff Papers 15833, University of Delaware, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
  17. Claudio Calcagno, 2012. "Stand-alone private antitrust damages: (how) should competition authorities react?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 365-389, October.
  18. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Kathryn Spier & Xinyu Hua, . "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1081, American Law & Economics Association.
  20. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages," NBER Working Papers 18594, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2012. "Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages," Discussion Papers 12-005, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  22. Spier, Kathryn E., 2001. "The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation†Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7hm4d39g, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  23. Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, 2011. "Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 497-524, June.
  24. Hüschelrath, Kai & Peyer, Sebastian, 2013. "Public and private enforcement of competition law: A differentiated approach," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-029, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  25. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "Legal Change and the Social Value of Lawsuits," Working papers 2008-34, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  26. Daniel L. Chen, 2015. "Can markets stimulate rights? On the alienability of legal claims," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 23-65, 03.
  27. Marvao, Catarina & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Buccirossi, Paolo, 2015. "Leniency and Damages," SITE Working Paper Series 32, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
  28. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
  29. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Public Enforcement of Law," Discussion Papers 05-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  30. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 181-201, July.
  31. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2kz8r3j1, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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