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An Economic Model of Legal Discovery

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jeong-Yoo Kim & Keunkwan Ryu, 2002. "Sanctions in Pre-Trial Discovery," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-60, July.
  2. Berlemann, Michael & Christmann, Robin, 2019. "Determinants of in-court settlements: empirical evidence from a German trial court," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-162, February.
  3. Ojo, Marianne, 2015. "Harmonisation du Hayek et Posner: Posner, Hayek et l'analyse économique du droit [Harmonising Hayek and Posner: revisiting Posner, Hayek & the economic analysis of Law]," MPRA Paper 65190, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  5. Mnookin, Robert & Wilson, Robert, 1998. "A Model of Efficient Discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 219-250, November.
  6. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 223-247.
  7. Cotton, Christopher, 2012. "Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 369-386.
  8. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Civil Litigation with Mandatory Discovery and Voluntary Transmission of Private Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 137-159, January.
  9. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
  10. Peter Grajzl & Katarina Zajc, 2017. "Litigation and the timing of settlement: evidence from commercial disputes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 287-319, October.
  11. Cooter, Robert D., 1997. "Commodifying Liability," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9pq4m8ts, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  12. Yasutora Watanabe, 2005. "Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation," 2005 Meeting Papers 440, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Waldfogel, Joel, 1998. "Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 451-476, October.
  14. Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
  15. Osborne, Evan, 1999. "Who should be worried about asymmetric information in litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 399-409, September.
  16. Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2023. "Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 26-35.
  17. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational lobbying and campaign finance reform when contributions buy access," Working Papers 2010-22, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  18. George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2004. "When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 37-58, January.
  19. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2002. "Contractual Intermediaries," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 362-384, October.
  20. Ojo, Marianne, 2015. "Decentralisation and The Evolution of Common Law," MPRA Paper 65803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Jesse Bull, 2009. "Costly Evidence And Systems Of Fact‐Finding," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 103-125, April.
  22. Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 767-803.
  23. Dandekar Suyog Ravindra & Raja Angara V., 2015. "Economic Analysis of Pre-trial Negotiations: A Behavioral Approach," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, April.
  24. Virginia Rosales-López, 2008. "Economics of court performance: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-251, June.
  25. Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2004. "Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System," NBER Working Papers 10825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Morgan Westéus, 2014. "Settlement probability asymmetries in the Swedish Labour Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 485-512, December.
  27. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February.
  28. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2020. "Disclosure and Discovery with fairness," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  29. Jonah B. Gelbach, 2016. "Can Simple Mechanism Design Results be Used to Implement the Proportionality Standard in Discovery?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 200-221, March.
  30. Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "Credible discovery, settlement, and negative expected value suits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 636-657, December.
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