IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/65190.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Harmonisation du Hayek et Posner: Posner, Hayek et l'analyse économique du droit
[Harmonising Hayek and Posner: revisiting Posner, Hayek & the economic analysis of Law]

Author

Listed:
  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

This paper is aimed at highlighting Posner and Hayek’s consensus on the importance of decentralization, as well as the significance of the incorporation of non-legal actors as tools for facilitating the efficient allocation of resources in common law. In addition to highlighting the consensus on the views of Posner and Hayek, in respect of decentralization of information within the judicial process, this paper aims to address why decentralization serves as a vital tool in facilitating the objective of common law as an efficiency allocation mechanism. Whilst it is argued that lower court judges may not and should not be given such flexibility to make and unmake the law, the principles and decisions of law lords acting in the capacity of legislature, have also illustrated in several leading cases that the flexibility intended by Parliament may be misinterpreted and wrongly applied in future cases. This has also resulted in the criticism of extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation. This paper analyses and expands on these observations. Ce document vise à mettre en évidence le consensus Posner et Hayek sur l'importance de la décentralisation, ainsi que l'importance de l'intégration des acteurs non juridiques comme des outils pour faciliter l'allocation efficace des ressources dans le droit commun. En plus de souligner le consensus sur les points de vue des Posner et Hayek, en ce qui concerne de centralisation de l'information dans le processus judiciaire, ce document vise à expliquer pourquoi de la centralisation sert comme un outil essentiel dans la facilitation de l'objectif du droit commun comme une répartition de l'efficacité mécanisme. Alors il est soutenu que juges des tribunaux inférieurs peuvent pas et ne doivent pas être administrés tels flexibilité pour faire et défaire la loi, les principes et les décisions des lords juristes agissant en qualité de législateur, ont également illustré conduisant dans plusieurs cas que la flexibilité voulue par Le Parlement peut être mal interprété et mal appliqué dans les cas futurs. Cela a également entraîné dans la critique des aides extrinsèques à l'interprétation des lois. Ce document analyse et élargit ces observations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2015. "Harmonisation du Hayek et Posner: Posner, Hayek et l'analyse économique du droit [Harmonising Hayek and Posner: revisiting Posner, Hayek & the economic analysis of Law]," MPRA Paper 65190, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:65190
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65190/1/MPRA_paper_65190.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Evolution of Common Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(1), pages 43-68.
    2. Anthony Niblett & Richard A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "The Evolution of a Legal Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 325-358.
    3. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
    4. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226320625 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Whitman, Douglas Glen, 2000. "Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 753-781, June.
    6. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1994. "An Economic Model of Legal Discovery," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 435-463, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robin Christmann, 2014. "No Judge, No Job! Court errors and the contingent labor contract," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 409-429, December.
    2. Rustam Romaniuc, 2012. "Judicial Dissent under Externalities and Incomplete Information," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 209-224, October.
    3. Guido Cozzi & Silvia Galli, 2014. "Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dynamics of growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 183-219, June.
    4. Nicola Gennaioli & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2015. "Optimally vague contracts and the law," Economics Working Papers 1410, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2017.
    5. Guido Cozzi & Silvia Galli, 2009. "Upstream Innovation Protection: Common Law Evolution and the Dynamics of Wage Inequality," Working Papers 2009_20, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    6. Chen, Daniel L., 2023. "Judicial compliance in district courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    7. Ash, Elliott & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2021. "Reducing partisanship in judicial elections can improve judge quality: Evidence from U.S. state supreme courts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    8. Yasutora Watanabe, 2005. "Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation," 2005 Meeting Papers 440, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Miceli, Thomas J., 2010. "Legal change and the social value of lawsuits," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 203-208, September.
    10. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2014. "Why Stare Decisis?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 17(4), pages 726-738, October.
    11. Flavio Menezes, 2013. "The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators by Andrei Shleifer ( MIT Press , Cambridge, Massachusetts , 2012 ), pp. 343 ," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 89(287), pages 577-580, December.
    12. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue," Working papers 2008-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    13. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2015. "Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 7-33.
    14. Baumann, Florian & Fagan, Frank, 2023. "When more isn’t always better: The ambiguity of fully transparent judicial action and unrestricted publication rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    15. Peter Grajzl & Katarina Zajc, 2017. "Litigation and the timing of settlement: evidence from commercial disputes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 287-319, October.
    16. Nicola Gennaioli & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2015. "Contract Innovation and Legal Evolution under Imperfect Enforcement," Working Papers 836, Barcelona School of Economics.
    17. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    18. Guerriero, C., 2009. "Democracy, Judicial Attitudes and Heterogeneity: The Civil Versus Common Law Tradition," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0917, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    19. Diana W. Thomas & Michael D. Thomas, 2022. "Regulation, competition, and the social control of business," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(1), pages 109-125, October.
    20. Virginia Rosales-López, 2008. "Economics of court performance: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-251, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    attentes légitime; de précédents judiciaires; interprétation de la loi; l'efficacité d'allocation; Pepper v Hart; Daubert; Le Domaine d'Edgar A. Berg v Commissaire; le droit commun;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:65190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.