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Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wang, Xianjue, 2021. "Disclosure by firms under voting pressure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
  2. Wael Almaqoushi & Ronan Powell, 2021. "Audit committee quality indices, reporting quality and firm value," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1-2), pages 185-229, January.
  3. Xiaohui Li & Yao Shen & Jing Xie, 2024. "Proxy Voting on CEO Pay: Evidence from Rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine," Working Papers 202412, University of Macau, Faculty of Business Administration.
  4. Susanna Gallani, 2015. "Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-019, Harvard Business School, revised Dec 2016.
  5. Gipper, Brandon, 2021. "The economic effects of expanded compensation disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
  6. Canil, Jean & Karpavičius, Sigitas, 2020. "Compensation consultants: Does reputation matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  7. Cabezon, Felipe, 2025. "Executive compensation: The trend toward one-size-fits-all," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1).
  8. Benjamin T. Albersmann & Reiner Quick, 2020. "The Impact of Audit Quality Indicators on the Timeliness of Goodwill Impairments: Evidence from the German Setting," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 56(1), pages 66-103, March.
  9. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.
  10. Ivan Diaz-Rainey & Paul A. Griffin & David H. Lont & Antonio J. Mateo-Márquez & Constancio Zamora-Ramírez, 2024. "Shareholder Activism on Climate Change: Evolution, Determinants, and Consequences," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 481-510, September.
  11. Guo, Xiaohu & Gupta, Vishal K. & Jackson, William E. & Mortal, Sandra C., 2021. "Is there a racial gap in CEO compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  12. Gulen, Huseyin & O'Brien, William J., 2017. "Option repricing, corporate governance, and the effect of shareholder empowerment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 389-415.
  13. Maffett, Mark & Nakhmurina, Anya & Skinner, Douglas J., 2022. "Importing activists: Determinants and consequences of increased cross-border shareholder activism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2).
  14. Duan, Ying & Jiao, Yawen & Tam, Kinsun, 2021. "Conflict of interest and proxy voting by institutional investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  15. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
  16. He, Yazhou Ellen, 2021. "Communications in proxy contests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  17. Lingwei Li & Huai Zhang, 2021. "The devil is in the detail? Investors’ mispricing of proxy voting outcomes on M&A deals," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3-4), pages 692-717, March.
  18. Masumoto, Kazuhide & Takeda, Fumiko, 2022. "Market reactions to proxy advisory companies’ recommendations in Japan," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
  19. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  20. Shu, Chong, 2024. "The proxy advisory industry: Influencing and being influenced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  21. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Sudipto Dasgupta & Thomas H. Noe, 2019. "Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders? Shareholder Democracy and Its Discontents," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1810-1832, April.
  23. Nan Li, 2021. "Do Majority‐of‐Minority Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 59(4), pages 1385-1423, September.
  24. Dutta, Shantanu & Officer, Micah S. & Wang, Ruixiang & Zhu, Pengcheng, 2025. "Do “say-on-pay” votes affect M&A decisions?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  25. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Jochem, Torsten & Rajamani, Anjana, 2020. "Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Isil Erel & Léa H Stern & Chenhao Tan & Michael S Weisbach, 2021. "Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning," NBER Chapters, in: Big Data: Long-Term Implications for Financial Markets and Firms, pages 3226-3264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Blankespoor, Elizabeth & deHaan, Ed & Marinovic, Iván, 2020. "Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2).
  28. Schneider, Julian, 2023. "Förderung der Transparenz oder Kosten für die Aktionäre? Beurteilung der Regulierung von Proxy Advisors anhand der U.S.-Marktreaktion [Promoting Transparency or Harming Shareholders? U.S. Market Re," Junior Management Science (JUMS), Junior Management Science e. V., vol. 8(1), pages 148-162.
  29. Loureiro, Gilberto & Mendonça, Cesar, 2024. "Do large registered investment funds undermine shareholder activism? Evidence from hedge fund proposals," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
  30. Miyachi, Hiroaki & Takeda, Fumiko, 2024. "Empirical study on voting results and proxy advisor recommendations in Japan," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
  31. Calluzzo, Paul & Kedia, Simi, 2019. "Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 669-688.
  32. Kind, Axel & Poltera, Marco & Zaia, Johannes, 2024. "The value of say on pay," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
  33. Tao Li, 2018. "Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2951-2971, June.
  34. Gerner-Beuerle, Carsten & Kirchmaier, Tom, 2016. "Say on pay: do shareholders care?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118983, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  35. Weili Ge & Lloyd Tanlu & Jenny Li Zhang, 2016. "What are the consequences of board destaggering?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 808-858, September.
  36. Peter Iliev & Svetla Vitanova, 2019. "The Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the United States," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4505-4521, October.
  37. Christie Hayne & Marshall Vance, 2019. "Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 57(4), pages 969-1011, September.
  38. Rachelle Belinga & Blanche Segrestin, 2018. "Principals and stewards? An exploration of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance," Post-Print hal-01791931, HAL.
  39. Nicola Cucari, 2019. "Determinants of say on pay vote: a configurational analysis," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 837-856, September.
  40. Matsusaka, John G. & Ozbas, Oguzhan & Yi, Irene, 2017. "Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions," Working Papers 262, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
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