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Imputing Proxy Advisor Recommendations

Author

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  • Jonathon Zytnick

Abstract

Proxy advisor recommendations play a central role in research on shareholder voting and corporate governance, yet they have become largely unavailable to academics. I develop a method to impute benchmark recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis using publicly available institutional voting data and estimated investor “follow rates”—the investor's likelihood of voting in line with each advisor. The method applies Bayes' theorem to infer recommendations from observed votes and iteratively updates both follow rates and imputations over successive rounds. To improve performance on contested proposals and avoid systematic bias, I estimate follow rates that vary by context—such as whether management and the other advisor agree with the recommendation. Validation against actual recommendations shows high accuracy: 96.4% of ISS recommendations imputed with 99.6% accuracy and 90.8% of Glass Lewis recommendations with 99.0% accuracy. Coverage improves substantially over prior approaches, especially for hard‐to‐classify proposals. I provide the full dataset of imputed recommendations as an Online Appendix for academic use.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathon Zytnick, 2025. "Imputing Proxy Advisor Recommendations," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(4), pages 525-543, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:22:y:2025:i:4:p:525-543
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.70006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David F. Larcker & Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, 2015. "Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 173-204.
    2. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, 2016. "The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(12), pages 3394-3427.
    3. Shu, Chong, 2024. "The proxy advisory industry: Influencing and being influenced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    4. repec:oup:revfin:v:29:y:2016:i:12:p:3394-3427. is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Alon Brav & Wei Jiang & Tao Li & James Pinnington, 2024. "Shareholder Monitoring through Voting: New Evidence from Proxy Contests," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(2), pages 591-638.
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