Performance-maximizing large contests
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2024. "Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2021.
"Winner’s effort maximization in large contests,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
- Stefano Barbieri & Marco Serena, 2020. "Winner's Effort Maximization in Large Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-13, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Bas J. Dietzenbacher & Aleksei Y. Kondratev, 2023. "Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3319-3339, June.
- Ta, Chi L., 2024. "Do conservation contests work? An analysis of a large-scale energy competitive rebate program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
- Qi Shi & Dong Hao, 2021. "Social Sourcing: Incorporating Social Networks Into Crowdsourcing Contest Design," Papers 2112.02884, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
- Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Yang, Siqiang & Zhu, Feng, 2025. "All-pay contests with unordered cost asymmetry: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
- Aner Sela, 2025. "Unsolicited prizes in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 65(1), pages 187-210, August.
- Protopappas, Konstantinos & Rietzke, David, 2025. "Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 586-621.
- Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022.
"The limits of meritocracy,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Mr. John Morgan & Justin Tumlinson & Mr. Felix J Vardy, 2018. "The Limits of Meritocracy," IMF Working Papers 2018/231, International Monetary Fund.
- repec:cam:camjip:2525 is not listed on IDEAS
- Goel, Sumit, 2025.
"Optimal grading contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 133-149.
- Sumit Goel, 2022. "Optimal grading contests," Papers 2205.05207, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
- Ratul Lahkar & Saptarshi Mukherjee, 2022. "Optimal Large Population Tullock Contests," Working Papers 82, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023.
"Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2020. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," Diskussionsschriften dp2011, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2023. "Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination," Papers 2302.09168, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
- Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
- Marcin Dziubi'nski & Sanjeev Goyal & Junjie Zhou, 2025. "Interconnected Contests," Papers 2510.11452, arXiv.org.
- Serhat Doğan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Large Tullock contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 169-179, October.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Mengxi Zhang, 2023. "Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_156v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Feng, Xin & Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2024. "Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
- Yaron Azrieli & Christopher P. Chambers, 2024. "Success functions in large contests," Papers 2403.07152, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
- Dziubiński, M. & Goyal, S. & Zhou, J., 2025. "Interconnected Contests," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2564, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Edith Elkind & Abheek Ghosh & Paul Goldberg, 2022. "Contests to Incentivize a Target Group," Papers 2204.14051, arXiv.org.
- Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
- Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2026. "Allocating Resources under Strategic Misrepresentation," Papers 2603.04173, arXiv.org.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/the/publsh/3588.html