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Performance-maximizing large contests

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2024. "Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
  2. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
  3. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Winner’s effort maximization in large contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  4. Bas J. Dietzenbacher & Aleksei Y. Kondratev, 2023. "Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3319-3339, June.
  5. Ta, Chi L., 2024. "Do conservation contests work? An analysis of a large-scale energy competitive rebate program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
  6. Qi Shi & Dong Hao, 2021. "Social Sourcing: Incorporating Social Networks Into Crowdsourcing Contest Design," Papers 2112.02884, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
  7. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Yang, Siqiang & Zhu, Feng, 2025. "All-pay contests with unordered cost asymmetry: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
  8. Aner Sela, 2025. "Unsolicited prizes in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 65(1), pages 187-210, August.
  9. Protopappas, Konstantinos & Rietzke, David, 2025. "Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 586-621.
  10. Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022. "The limits of meritocracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  11. repec:cam:camjip:2525 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Goel, Sumit, 2025. "Optimal grading contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 133-149.
  13. Ratul Lahkar & Saptarshi Mukherjee, 2022. "Optimal Large Population Tullock Contests," Working Papers 82, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
  14. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023. "Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  15. Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2023. "Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination," Papers 2302.09168, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  16. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  17. Marcin Dziubi'nski & Sanjeev Goyal & Junjie Zhou, 2025. "Interconnected Contests," Papers 2510.11452, arXiv.org.
  18. Serhat Doğan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Large Tullock contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 169-179, October.
  19. Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2023. "Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  20. Mengxi Zhang, 2023. "Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_156v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  21. Feng, Xin & Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2024. "Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
  22. Yaron Azrieli & Christopher P. Chambers, 2024. "Success functions in large contests," Papers 2403.07152, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
  23. Dziubiński, M. & Goyal, S. & Zhou, J., 2025. "Interconnected Contests," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2564, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  24. Edith Elkind & Abheek Ghosh & Paul Goldberg, 2022. "Contests to Incentivize a Target Group," Papers 2204.14051, arXiv.org.
  25. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  26. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
  27. Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2026. "Allocating Resources under Strategic Misrepresentation," Papers 2603.04173, arXiv.org.
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