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Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Woojin Lee, 2008. "Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: The uni-dimensional case," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2008-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2008.
  2. Dimitrios Xefteris & Galina Zudenkova, 2018. "Electoral competition under costly policy implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 721-739, April.
  3. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, September.
  4. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Games: The Hybrid Case," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 827-857, October.
  5. Drouvelis, Michalis & Saporiti, Alejandro & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2014. "Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 86-115.
  6. Francisco Rodr'iguez & Eduardo Zambrano, 2021. "Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model," Papers 2107.07910, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
  7. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2020. "Silent promotion of agendas: campaign contributions and ideological polarization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 93-117, January.
  8. Ikuho Kochi & Raúl Ponce Rodríguez, 2012. "Political competition and the (in)effectiveness of redistribution in a federation," Estudios Regionales en Economía, Población y Desarrollo. Cuadernos de Trabajo de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez. 10, Cuerpo Académico 41 de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, revised 09 Dec 2012.
  9. Alex Cukierman & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "When is the median voter paradigm a reasonable guide for policy choices in a representative democracy?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 247-284, November.
  10. Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez & Ikuho Kochi & Luis E. Gutiérrez Casas, 2015. "The structure of political power and redistribution in economies with multiple governments," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(2), pages 269-303.
  11. Ikuho Kochi & Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez, 2010. "Do Remittances Crowd Out The Government¡¯S Redistributive Policy?," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 35(4), pages 45-72, December.
  12. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2013. "Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Downsian Dynamics," IDEI Working Papers 778, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  13. JuanD. Carrillo & Micael Castanheira, 2008. "Information and Strategic Political Polarisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 845-874, July.
  14. John Duggan & César Martinelli, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Responsive Democracy," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(627), pages 675-715.
  15. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
  16. Francisco Rodríguez & Eduardo Zambrano, 2022. "Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 105-116, May.
  17. Aggeborn, Linuz, 2013. "Voter Turnout and the Size of Government," Working Paper Series 2013:20, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  18. Bagh, Adib, 2014. "Candidates' Uncertainty and Error Distribution Models in Electoral Competitions," MPRA Paper 77631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  20. Alejandro Saporiti, 2010. "Power, ideology, and electoral competition," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1003, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  21. Gábor Virág, 2008. "Playing for Your Own Audience: Extremism in Two‐Party Elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 891-922, October.
  22. Albert Solé Ollé, 2005. "The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain," Working Papers 2005/2, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  23. Kristy Buzard, 2017. "Trade Agreements in the Shadow of Lobbying," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 21-43, February.
  24. De Donder, Philippe & Gallego, Maria, 2017. "Electoral Competition and Party Positioning," TSE Working Papers 17-760, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  25. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Trannoy, Alain & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2003. "Voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed: the overtaxation bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 595-626, March.
  26. Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, 2008. "Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize Incomes?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 391-415, November.
  27. Diego Carrasco Novoa & Shino Takayamaz & Yuki Tamura & Terence Yeo, 2020. "Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogeneous Valences," Discussion Papers Series 631, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  28. Aggeborn, Linuz, 2013. "Voter Turnout and the Size of Government," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2013:14, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  29. Oleg Smirnov & James H. Fowler, 2007. "Policy-Motivated Parties in Dynamic Political Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(1), pages 9-31, January.
  30. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
  31. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & John E. Roemer, 2000. "Endogenous Party Formation And The Effect Of Income Distribution On Policy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  32. Castanheira, Micael & Carrillo, Juan, 2002. "Platform Divergence, Political Efficiency and the Median Voter Theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2006. "The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 145-176, January.
  34. Shino Takayama, 2014. "A Model of Two-stage Electoral Competition with Strategic Voters," Discussion Papers Series 525, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  35. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.
  36. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.
  37. Tomer Blumkin & Volker Grossmann, 2010. "May increased partisanship lead to convergence of parties’ policy platforms?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 547-569, December.
  38. Alejandro Saporiti, 2005. "On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition," Game Theory and Information 0504005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Ikuho Kochi & Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez, 2011. "Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 26(1), pages 123-149.
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