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Donation-Based Crowdfunding with Refund Bonuses

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Abraham, Diya & Corazzini, Luca & Fišar, Miloš & Reggiani, Tommaso, 2023. "Coordinating donations via an intermediary: The destructive effect of a sunk overhead cost," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 287-304.
  2. Lars Hornuf & Johannes Voshaar, 2024. "What Is an Effective Signal in Crowdfunding? Evidence from Expert Researchers and a Meta-Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 11501, CESifo.
  3. Timothy N. Cason & Alex Tabarrok & Robertas Zubrickas, 2025. "Signaling Quality: How Refund Bonuses Can Overcome Information Asymmetries in Crowdfunding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(7), pages 5933-5947, July.
  4. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Theories of Crowdfunding and Token Issues: A Review," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-28, May.
  5. Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10081, CESifo.
  6. Zhi Li & Pengfei Liu & Stephen K. Swallow, 2021. "Assurance Contracts to Support Multi-Unit Threshold Public Goods in Environmental Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(2), pages 339-378, October.
  7. Corazzini, Luca & Cotton, Christopher S. & Longo, Enrico & Reggiani, Tommaso, 2024. "Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
  8. Chan, Nathan W. & Wolk, Leonard, 2020. "Cost-effective giving with multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 130-145.
  9. Chandrayee Chatterjee & James C. Cox & Michael K. Price & Florian Rundhammer, 2020. "Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Understanding How State Tax Credits Impact Charitable Giving," NBER Working Papers 27163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Fang, Xing, 2022. "Why we hide good deeds? The selfless and anonymous donation behavior in crowdfunding," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  11. Swati Gupta & Sahil Raj & Sanjay Gupta & Ajay Sharma, 2023. "Prioritising crowdfunding benefits: a fuzzy-AHP approach," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 379-403, February.
  12. Maja Adena & Steffen Huck, 2022. "Voluntary ‘donations’ versus reward-oriented ‘contributions’: two experiments on framing in funding mechanisms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1399-1417, November.
  13. Vijaya & Ajit Yadav & Himendu Prakash Mathur, 2024. "Reconnoitering antecedents of donation intention in donation crowdfunding campaigns: a mediating role of crowdfunding readiness," International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, Springer;International Association of Public and Non-Profit Marketing, vol. 21(1), pages 229-254, March.
  14. He, Simin & Zhu, Xun, 2023. "Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 454-479.
  15. Cason, Timothy N. & Tabarrok, Alex & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2021. "Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 78-95.
  16. Lattimer, Timothy R.B. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2023. "Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
  17. Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10081, CESifo.
  18. Korzynski, Pawel & Haenlein, Michael & Rautiainen, Mika, 2021. "Impression management techniques in crowdfunding: An analysis of Kickstarter videos using artificial intelligence," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 675-684.
  19. Zhi Li & Dongsheng Chen & Pengfei Liu, 2023. "Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 407-436, April.
  20. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Enrico Longo & Tommaso Reggiani, 2021. "The Gates Effect in Public Goods Experiments: How Donations Flow to the Recipients Favored by the Wealthy," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2021-13, Masaryk University, revised Aug 2024.
  21. Chiara D’Arcangelo & Azzurra Morreale & Luigi Mittone & Mikael Collan, 2023. "Ignorance is bliss? Information and risk on crowdfunding platforms," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(6), pages 1-24, June.
  22. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Enrico Longo & Tommaso Reggiani, 2022. "Pro-Rich and Progressive: Policy Selection and Contributions in Threshold Public Goods Experiments," Working Paper 1471, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  23. Boudreau, Kevin J. & Jeppesen, Lars Bo & Reichstein, Toke & Rullani, Francesco, 2021. "Crowdfunding as Donations to Entrepreneurial Firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(7).
  24. Siriphong Sirisawat & Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard & Supaporn Kiattisin & Sirimon Treepongkaruna, 2022. "The future of digital donation crowdfunding," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(11), pages 1-21, November.
  25. Robertas Zubrickas, 2020. "Contingent wage subsidy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(4), pages 1105-1119, August.
  26. Luca Corazzini & Matteo M. Marini, 2022. "Focal points in multiple threshold public goods games: A single-project meta-analysis," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2022-10, Masaryk University, revised Feb 2023.
  27. Diya Elizabeth Abraham & Luca Corazzini & Miloš Fišar & Tommaso Reggiani, 2021. "Delegation and Overhead Aversion with Multiple Threshold Public Goods," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2021-14, Masaryk University, revised Feb 2023.
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