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Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States

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Cited by:

  1. Scheufele, Gabriela & Bennett, Jeff, 2017. "Can payments for ecosystem services schemes mimic markets?," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 30-37.
  2. Bayona, Anna & Brandts, Jordi & Vives, Xavier, 2020. "Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 354-369.
  3. Ollikka, Kimmo, 2014. "Essays on auction mechanisms and information in regulating pollution," Research Reports 66, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
  4. Holt, Charles A. & Shobe, William M., 2016. "Reprint of: Price and quantity collars for stabilizing emission allowance prices: Laboratory experiments on the EU ETS market stability reserve," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 69-86.
  5. Chih Chang, Ching & Chia Lai, Tin, 2013. "Carbon allowance allocation in the transportation industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1091-1097.
  6. Warwick McKibbin & Adele Morris & Peter Wilcoxen, 2014. "A Proposal to Integrate Price Mechanisms into International Climate Negotiations," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 600-608, September.
  7. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021. "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
  8. Rachel Bodsky & Domenic Donato & Kevin James & David Porter, 2012. "Experimental Evidence on the Properties of the California’s Cap and Trade Price Containment Reserve," Working Papers 12-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  9. Chloé Le Coq & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Financial contracts as coordination device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 241-259, April.
  10. Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata & Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2022. "Mind your Ps and Qs! Variable allowance supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
  11. Luca Corazzini & Stefano Galavotti & Rupert Sausgruber & Paola Valbonesi, 2017. "Allotment in first-price auctions: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(1), pages 70-99, March.
  12. Bayona, Anna & Manzano, Carolina, 2024. "Competition in schedules with cursed traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  13. Balmford, Ben & Collins, Joseph & Day, Brett & Lindsay, Luke & Peacock, James, 2023. "Pricing rules for PES auctions: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  14. Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018. "An efficient and implementable auction for environmental rights," Discussion Papers Series 587, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  15. Regina Betz & Ben Greiner & Sascha Schweitzer & Stefan Seifert, 2017. "Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 351-371, October.
  16. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9266, CESifo.
  17. Chen, Xun-Qi & Ma, Chao-Qun & Ren, Yi-Shuai & Lei, Yu-Tian, 2023. "Carbon allowance auction design of China's ETS: A comprehensive hierarchical system based on blockchain," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1003-1019.
  18. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2021. "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  19. Han, Rong & Yu, Bi-Ying & Tang, Bao-Jun & Liao, Hua & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2017. "Carbon emissions quotas in the Chinese road transport sector: A carbon trading perspective," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 298-309.
  20. Ollikka, Kimmo, 2014. "Essays on auction mechanisms and information in regulating pollution," Research Reports P66, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
  21. Liu, Lin & Liu, Liqun & Liu, Kai & Jiménez-Zarco, Ana Isabel, 2025. "Climate policy and corporate green transformation: Empirical evidence from carbon emission trading," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  22. Veronika Grimm & Lyuba Ilieva, 2013. "An experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 308-338, December.
  23. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018. "Permit market auctions with allowance reserves," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 283-306.
  24. Vives, Xavier & Bayona, Anna & Brandts, Jordi, 2016. "Supply Function Competition, Private Information, and Market Power: A Laboratory Study," IESE Research Papers D/1146, IESE Business School.
  25. Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2021. "An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(4), pages 571-585, April.
  26. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kim, Soo Jin & Pal, Pallavi, 2024. "Curbing price fluctuations in cap-and-trade auctions under changing demand expectations," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
  27. Jae-Do Song & Young-Hwan Ahn, 2021. "Price Discovery of Consignment Auctions for Emission Permits," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-13, October.
  28. Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan & Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2020. "Mind your Ps and Qs! An Experiment on Variable Allowance Supply in the US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Discussion Papers Series 618, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
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