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Citations for "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs"

by Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli

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  1. Lewis A. Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012. "Contracts between Legal Persons," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
  2. Rubinchik-Pessach, Anna, 2005. "Can decentralization be beneficial?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1231-1249, July.
  3. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2010. "Incentive provision when contracting is costly," Discussion Papers 2010/10, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  4. Dana Heller & Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Contradiction as a Form of Contractual Incompleteness," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000978, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," TSE Working Papers 09-075, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  6. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," Post-Print halshs-01328626, HAL.
  7. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  8. Evelina Mengova, 2014. "Quality of Institutions and Outsourcing," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 639-659, December.
  9. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2000. "Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 407, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  10. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2004. "Endogenous Verifiability in Relational Contracting," Discussion Papers 2004/20, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2008. "Costly contracting in a long-term relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 352-377.
  12. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2007. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," NBER Working Papers 13235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
  14. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2008. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(12), pages 1963-1979, December.
  15. Ernst-Ludwig Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2014. "Multi-task agency with unawareness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 197-222, August.
  16. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2009. "Diversity, identity, and the indeterminacy of the size of nations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 15-38, February.
  17. Jean Beuve & Claudine Desrieux, 2016. "Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 125-158, January.
  18. Steven Shavell, 2003. "On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts," NBER Working Papers 10094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Fares, M’hand, 2005. "Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 81(3), pages 535-555, Septembre.
  20. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2001. "Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: a game theoretical model under fuzzy information," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics 91, Cattaneo University (LIUC).
  21. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.