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Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Navin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner & Richard Van Weelden, 2021. "Delegation in Veto Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(12), pages 4046-4087, December.
  2. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
  3. Ali Kamranzadeh & Charles Z. Zheng, 2025. "Unequal Peace," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(1), pages 223-258, February.
  4. Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017. "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 133-164.
  5. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
  6. Thierry Mayer & Isabelle Méjean & Mathias Thoenig, 2025. "The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety," Working Papers 2025-23, CEPII research center.
  7. Madhav S. Aney, 2012. "Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach," Working Papers 18-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  8. Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2021. "Peace through bribing," Papers 2107.11575, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  9. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
  10. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
  11. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 348, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  12. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Bilateral trading with naive traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 544-557, June.
  13. Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/32, European University Institute.
  14. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2025. "Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(4), pages 1421-1453, June.
  15. Stefano Galavotti & Nozomu Muto & Daisuke Oyama, 2011. "On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 87-123, September.
  16. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2016. "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Monash Economics Working Papers 21-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  17. Morteza Honarvar & Joanna Krysta & Eric Tang, 2026. "Filling Positions Without Transfers: Screening on Outside Options," Papers 2602.10428, arXiv.org.
  18. Vianney Dequiedt & David Martimort, 2015. "Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2141-2182, July.
  19. Johannes Hörner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Mediation and Peace," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1483-1501.
  20. Takashi Shimizu, 2017. "Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1071-1088, November.
  21. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
  22. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2014. "Beliefs, payoffs, information: On the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 136-153.
  23. Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019. "Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 11-16.
  24. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2020. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval," Working Papers hal-02440627, HAL.
  25. Flesch, János & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016. "Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 68-75.
  26. Chang, Dongkyu, 2021. "Optimal sales mechanism with outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
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