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Deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort functions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Narayana R. Kocherlakota & Ilhyock Shim, 2007. "Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(5), pages 1107-1129, August.
  2. Nechita Radu, 2003. "Demand Deposits Insurance and Double Liability : The effect On Incentives," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-44, March.
  3. Ralf Bebenroth & Diemo Dietrich & Uwe Vollmer, 2009. "Bank regulation and supervision in bank-dominated financial systems: a comparison between Japan and Germany," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 177-209, April.
  4. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  5. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
  6. Spiegel, Mark M., 2005. "Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 203-219, January.
  7. Laurent Le Maux, 2021. "Bagehot for Central Bankers," Working Papers hal-03201509, HAL.
  8. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 65(2), pages 580-608, May.
  9. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  10. Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2009. "Bagehot for beginners: The making of lending of last resort operations in the mid-19th century," Working Paper 2009/22, Norges Bank.
  11. Antoine Martin, 2005. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11," Staff Reports 217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  12. Ilhyock Shim, 2011. "Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1625-1661, December.
  13. Robert P. Gray, 2004. "Australia's Implicit Deposit Insurance — Should It Be Reconsidered?," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 14(32), pages 41-52, March.
  14. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  15. Brierley, Peter, 2024. "Principles and techniques to resolve large banks whose failure could have systemic consequences," Bank of England working papers 1056, Bank of England.
  16. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macro-prudential concerns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 630-657, September.
  17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/153e5es3a8988omf0qkf000ql2 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  19. Antoine Martin, 2002. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to Sept. 11," Research Working Paper RWP 02-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  20. Antoine Martin, 2006. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 197-211, May.
  21. Klüh, Ulrich, 2005. "Safety Net Design and Systemic Risk: New Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers in Economics 662, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  22. Marie-Laure Djelic & Joel Bothello, 2013. "Limited liability and its moral hazard implications: the systemic inscription of instability in contemporary capitalism," Post-Print hal-01891963, HAL.
  23. Marie-Laure Djelic & Joel Bothello, 2013. "Limited liability and its moral hazard implications: the systemic inscription of instability in contemporary capitalism," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/153e5es3a89, Sciences Po.
  24. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_010 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Gurbachan Singh & Girijesh Kumar Tiwari, 2007. "Bank Runs, Lender of Last Resort, Suspension of Convertibility, and Enabling Laws," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 6(1), pages 123-144, January.
  26. David VanHoose, 2007. "Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking: Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?," NFI Working Papers 2007-WP-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
  27. Marco A Espinosa-Vega & Mr. Rafael Matta & Mr. Charles M. Kahn & Mr. Juan Sole, 2011. "Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture," IMF Working Papers 2011/193, International Monetary Fund.
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