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Implementation in generalized matching problems

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Cited by:

  1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Gabriel Desgranges & Étienne Wasmer, 2000. "Appariements sur le marché du logement," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 58, pages 253-287.
  3. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
  4. Ménard, Sébastien, 2012. "Should we tax vacant dwellings? A search equilibrium model applied to the rental housing market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 88-90.
  5. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
  6. Klaus, Bettina, 2011. "Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 172-186, May.
  7. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
  8. Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji, 2003. "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 379-389, August.
  9. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December.
  10. Aslan, Fatma & Lainé, Jean, 2020. "Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 66-78.
  11. Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
  12. Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus, 2017. "Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 435-455, May.
  13. Klaus, Bettina & Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2006. "Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 106-110, October.
  14. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
  15. Florig, Michael & Rivera, Jorge, 2017. "Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 145-153.
  16. Papai, Szilvia, 2003. "Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 931-959, November.
  17. Jaeok Park, 2015. "Competitive Equilibrium and Singleton Cores in Generalized Matching Problems (published in:International Journal of Game Theory, May 2017, Vol.46, Issue2, 487-509)," Working papers 2015rwp-85, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  18. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
  19. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  20. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2001. "The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 89-102, January.
  21. Kumano, Taro, 2017. "Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 230-240.
  22. Konishi, Hideo & Quint, Thomas & Wako, Jun, 2001. "On the Shapley-Scarf economy: the case of multiple types of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-15, February.
  23. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2005. "An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 298-303, November.
  24. Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
  25. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 358-369, February.
  26. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 537-554, October.
  28. Satoshi Nakada & Ryo Shirakawa, 2023. "On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 517-521, April.
  29. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2019. "Double implementation without no-veto-power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 124-130.
  30. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
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