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Implementation in generalized matching problems

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
  2. Ménard, Sébastien, 2012. "Should we tax vacant dwellings? A search equilibrium model applied to the rental housing market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 88-90.
  3. Klaus, Bettina, 2011. "Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 172-186, May.
  4. Basteck, Christian, 2024. "An axiomatization of the random priority rule," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2024-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  5. Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
  6. Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus, 2017. "Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 435-455, May.
  7. Florig, Michael & Rivera, Jorge, 2017. "Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 145-153.
  8. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December.
  9. Aslan, Fatma & Lainé, Jean, 2020. "Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 66-78.
  10. Klaus, Bettina & Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2006. "Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 106-110, October.
  11. Christian Basteck, 2024. "An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 502, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  12. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2001. "The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 89-102, January.
  13. Konishi, Hideo & Quint, Thomas & Wako, Jun, 2001. "On the Shapley-Scarf economy: the case of multiple types of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-15, February.
  14. Gabriel Desgranges & Étienne Wasmer, 2000. "Appariements sur le marché du logement," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 58, pages 253-287.
  15. Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
  16. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
  17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2010. "Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 537-554, October.
  19. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2011. "Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 147-169, September.
  21. Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji, 2003. "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 379-389, August.
  22. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
  23. Papai, Szilvia, 2003. "Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 931-959, November.
  24. Jaeok Park, 2015. "Competitive Equilibrium and Singleton Cores in Generalized Matching Problems (published in:International Journal of Game Theory, May 2017, Vol.46, Issue2, 487-509)," Working papers 2015rwp-85, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  25. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
  26. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  27. Kumano, Taro, 2017. "Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 230-240.
  28. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2005. "An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 298-303, November.
  29. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 358-369, February.
  30. Satoshi Nakada & Ryo Shirakawa, 2023. "On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 517-521, April.
  31. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2019. "Double implementation without no-veto-power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 124-130.
  32. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
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