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Appariements sur le marché du logement

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  • Gabriel Desgranges
  • Étienne Wasmer

Abstract

This paper attempts to build a theory of rental housing markets in which search frictiona are made endogenous by a matching function between landlords and agents willing to rent. The rent is determined either according to a "Nash-bargaining" game between landlords and tenants, or fixed ex ante by the tenant. In both cases, we discuss the impact of the taxation of vacant apartments and show that protecting the tenants has an adverse effect on the outsiders, as on the labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel Desgranges & Étienne Wasmer, 2000. "Appariements sur le marché du logement," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 58, pages 253-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2000:i:58:p:253-287
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076236
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariona Segú & Benjamin Vignolles, 2016. "Taxing Vacant Apartments: Can fiscal policy reduce vacancy?," Working Papers 2016.02, International Network for Economic Research - INFER.
    2. Pierre-Philippe Combes & Bruno Decreuse & Benoît Schmutz & Alain Trannoy, 2010. "The Neighbor is King: Customer Discrimination in the Housing Market," IDEP Working Papers 1003, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jun 2010.
    3. Segú, Mariona & Vignolles, Benjamin, 2018. "Taxing Vacant Dwellings: Can fiscal policy reduce vacancy?," MPRA Paper 85508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Etienne Wasmer, 2005. "Housing market discrimination, housing regulations and intermediaries," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-01053551, HAL.

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