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A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(20), pages 1-8.
  2. Yasemin Dede & Semih Koray, 2018. "Every member of the core is as respectful as any other," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 55-65, June.
  3. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:20:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  7. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September.
  8. Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
  9. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
  10. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
  11. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2006. "Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 771-793, September.
  12. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1990. "On the theory of cost sharing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 71-82, February.
  13. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1998. "Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 224-244, April.
  14. Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji, 2003. "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 379-389, August.
  15. Chen-Ying Huang & Tomas Sjöström, 2010. "The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(2), pages 1-23, April.
  16. Messan Agbaglah, 2017. "Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 435-459, March.
  17. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  18. Tone Dieckmann & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2000. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1878, Econometric Society.
  19. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 358-369, February.
  20. Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
  21. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
  22. Agust'in G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2020. "Stable decompositions of coalition formation games," Papers 2009.11689, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
  23. Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 409-428.
  24. Tone Dieckmann; & Ulrich Schwalbe, 1998. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Economics Department Working Paper Series n810798, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  25. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  26. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0652, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2006.
  27. Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
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