IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/jeeman/v27y1994i2p127-146.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Millock, Katrin & Xabadia, Angels & Zilberman, David, 2012. "Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 102-116.
  2. Millock, Katrin & Sunding, David & Zilberman, David, 2002. "Regulating Pollution with Endogenous Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-241, September.
  3. Iskandar, Deden Dinar & Wuenscher, Tobias & Badhuri, Anik, 2012. "The Determinants of Compliance on Environmental Tax: The Insights of Theoretical and Experimental Approaches Motivated by the Case of Indonesia," 86th Annual Conference, April 16-18, 2012, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 134977, Agricultural Economics Society.
  4. Ya-Po Yang & Jin-Li Hu, 2012. "Gresham’s law in environmental protection," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 103-122, April.
  5. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
  6. Brennan, Donna C., 1999. "Pollution Control Policies For Australian Prawn Farms," 1999 Conference (43th), January 20-22, 1999, Christchurch, New Zealand 123774, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  7. Spraggon, John, 2002. "Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
  8. Lehmann, Paul, 2008. "Using a Policy Mix for Pollution Control – A Review of Economic Literature," MPRA Paper 21354, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June.
  10. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
  11. Prieger, James E. & Sanders, Nicholas J., 2012. "Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426.
  12. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.
  13. Katrin Millock & Angels Xabadia & David Zilberman, 2009. "Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities," Post-Print halshs-00367888, HAL.
  14. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February.
  15. Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
  16. Gustafsson, Bo, 1998. "Scope and limits of the market mechanism in environmental management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 259-274, February.
  17. Blackman, Allen & Harrington, Winston, 1999. "The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution," RFF Working Paper Series dp-99-39, Resources for the Future.
  18. Schmutzler, Armin & Goulder, Lawrence H., 1997. "The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-64, January.
  19. Bontems, P. & Bourgeon, J.M., 2002. "Technological standards, environmental taxation and pollution monitoring," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 40, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
  20. Evans, Mary F. & Gilpatric, Scott M. & Liu, Lirong, 2009. "Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 284-292, May.
  21. Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, 2002. "The Case for a Two-Part Instrument: Presumptive Tax and Environmental Subsidy," Chapters, in: Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman (ed.), The Economics of Household Garbage and Recycling Behavior, chapter 10, pages 175-200, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  22. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
  23. Harford, Jon D., 2000. "Initial and Continuing Compliance and the Trade-Off between Monitoring and Control Cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 151-163, September.
  24. Philippe Bontems & Jean‐Marc Bourgeon, 2007. "On Environmental Policy and Permitting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 771-792, October.
  25. Hans W. Gottinger, 2000. "Environmental Regulation with Optimal Monitoring and Enforcement," CSEF Working Papers 49, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  26. Sproul, Thomas W. & Zilberman, David, 2011. "Accidents Happen: The Effect of Uncertainty on Environmental Policy Design," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103927, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.